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Abstract 
I develop an account of the relationship between aesthetics and knowledge, focusing on 
scientific practice. Cognitivists infer from ‘partial sensitivity’—aesthetic appreciation partly 
depends on doxastic states—to ‘factivity’, the idea that the truth or otherwise of those beliefs 
makes a difference to aesthetic appreciation. Rejecting factivity, I develop a notion of ‘epistemic 
engagement’: partaking genuinely in a knowledge-directed process of coming to epistemic 
judgements, and suggest that this better accommodates the relationship between the aesthetic 
and the epistemic. Scientific training (and other knowledge-directed activities), I argue, involve 
‘attunement’: the co-option of aesthetic judgements towards epistemic ends. Thus, the 
connection between aesthetic appreciation and knowledge is psychological and contingent. This 
view has consequences for the warrant of aesthetic judgment in science, namely, the locus of 
justification are those processes of attunement, not the aesthetic judgements themselves. 
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1. Walking through time 
The Jurassic coast straddles South-West England’s Dorset and Devon, almost 100 miles of 
eroded cliffs and hidden coves built from red sandstone, clays and shale. Exploring the coast, we 
step through layers of history. From the Napoleonic wars the coast was a favourite for British 
holidaygoers, hence the Victorian touches: gazebos and seaside boardwalks. Tourism and rich 
fossil deposits led to the coast becoming a hotbed of nineteenth-century geology, remembered 
via fossil shops, local museums, and tours. Humans have lived here for millennia: Beer’s limestone 
quarry notes time’s passage via underground arches ranging across Gothic, Norman, Anglo-Saxon 
and Roman architectural styles. And the exposed cliffs speak to the region’s Mesozoic history. As 
imagined by Le Beche in the 1830s, during the Jurassic this was an inland sea, a realm of souring 
pterosaurs and alien aquatic reptiles, plesiosaurs, ichthyosaurs and their kin; during the Triassic a 
desert, and the Cretaceous a swamp.  
On the Jurassic Coast, historical knowledge and aesthetic appreciation are intimate 
bedfellows. It is tempting to say that knowing about the coast’s history deepens our 
appreciation, and that such appreciation—seeing the cliff’s strata with an aesthetic eye, say—is 





1 “Duria Antiquior – A more ancient dorset” Henry le Beche’s imagining of the Jurassic coast during the Jurassic 
period (Wikimedia Commons). 
I’m going to argue that the relationships between aesthetic value and judgement, and 
scientific knowledge, are best understood via psychological (as opposed to conceptual, semantic 
or metaphysical) connections. In brief, scientific training co-opts and develops scientists’ 
aesthetic judgements, training their aesthetic faculties towards various epistemic purposes. On 
this view, scientists see aesthetic value in their instruments, data, explanations, and the worlds 
these reveal, not because there is a direct connection between truth and beauty (or, more 
carefully, between aesthetic engagement and epistemic success), but  because scientific training 
teaches us to see truth as beautiful (or, more carefully, scientific training ‘attunes’ aesthetic 
judgment to epistemic purposes). This has upshots for understanding scientific success and 
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justification: if my view is right, then the justification of scientists’ aesthetic judgements turns on 
the epistemic practices and training that elicit their judgements. 
I’ll develop my view by considering Derek Turner’s ground-breaking Paleoaesthetics ([2019]). 
There, Turner develops and defends what he calls ‘historical cognitivism’, the idea that 
knowledge of an object’s history enriches our aesthetic appreciation of that object. He further 
argues that understanding how the epistemic and aesthetic intermingle is necessary for 
explaining scientific success. Although I endorse the latter claim, I’ll present two objections to 
historical cognitivism. First, a conceptual argument decoupling truth from aesthetic appreciation; 
second, an argument from scientific practice, appealing to widespread ‘useful falsehoods’. I’ll 
then introduce ‘epistemic engagement’, arguing it better explains the connection between 
knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, particularly when tied to a psychological thesis 
concerning the co-option of aesthetic sensibilities in scientific training. I’ll briefly turn to the 
justification of scientists’ aesthetic judgment in the conclusion. 
I should clarify our aesthetic and epistemic targets. Distinguish high- and low-falutin’ 
conceptions of aesthetics. High-falutin’ conceptions decouple aesthetic judgments and 
sensibilities from our particular idiosyncratic contexts, desires and aims. Kant’s conception of 
aesthetic value, involving the disinterested ‘pure’ consideration of an object’s beauty vis-a-vis 
form, is high-falutin’ (Ginsborg [2019]) as is Plato’s. Low-falutin’ conceptions see aesthetics as 
connected to, or continuous with, other judgements and our baser pleasures and desires. My 
approach is firmly low-falutin’: on more ineffable conceptions it is difficult to imagine how 
aesthetic sensibilities could be richly embedded with the more-or-less mundane day-to-day 
scientific practices we’re concerned with1. Following this, I’ll not concern myself much with the 
 
1 Is this conception too permissive, loading the dice in my favour by infusing any human activity with 
aesthetic content? I tend to think aesthetic appreciation is embedded within human activities, but 
regardless, my argument would run mutatis mutandis on more restrictive conceptions of low falutin’ 
aesthetic value (machinery from everyday aesthetics might be useful for that project, see Saito 2019) 
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nature of aesthetic judgment or sensibilities: I’ll consider various scientific activities (geological 
sketches, for instance) to be unproblematically aesthetic insofar as they engage aesthetic 
sensibilities and involve aesthetic value. 
The majority of philosophy concerning the connections between aesthetics and 
epistemology have focused on apparently aesthetic values such as ‘simplicity’ in theory 
acceptance, exploring the possible connection between a hypothesis’ ‘loveliness’ and its 
‘likeliness’ (Lipton [2003]). Philosophers ask after the aesthetic values of theories and their 
relationship to justification, that is, do beautiful (or ‘graceful’, or ‘unified’) theories indicate 
epistemic success? Perhaps through some meta-induction2 (McAllister [1999], Kuipers [2002]), or 
by playing a role in the coherence of scientific judgment (Thagard [2015]), or by indicating 
understanding (Ivanova [2017b]). 
My view follows the spirit of James McAllister ([1999]), who also appeals to learning 
processes in co-opting aesthetic judgments, painting the connection between aesthetics and 
epistemology in psychological hues. However, we differ. I’ll not begin by considering the 
justification of scientific products like theories, but instead their practices: the processes of 
knowledge-production scientists engage in.  McAllister is theory-focused and is interested 
primarily in how aesthetic judgments about theories might matter for those theories’ 
justification. He also argues for a meta-inductive link between aesthetics and epistemology. By 
contrast, in the conclusion I’ll argue that the justificatory role of aesthetic (or other non-
epistemic) values in science should be understood in the context of the practices they are geared 
towards and the relevant pedagogical processes which produce and maintain them. Like 
McAllister’s, my view maintains a deep (if psychological) connection between our knowledge of 
nature and the richness of our aesthetic considerations of it.  
 
2 That is, aesthetic judgements have previously been linked to successful theories, and so are likely to 
in the future. 
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2. Historical Cognitivism 
Cognitivism about nature connects aesthetic appreciation with knowledge: true beliefs about 
nature improves aesthetic judgements (Carlson [2005], [1981], Saito [2008], Matthews [2008]). 
The view is traditionally developed in comparison with cognitivism about art. Just as knowing the 
correct artistic categories is required for correctly aesthetically appreciating artistic products 
(cognitivists claim) so are the correct natural categories required for making correct aesthetic 
judgements about nature. And those natural categories are provided by science: ‘aesthetically 
appreciating nature requires knowledge of the different environments of nature and of its 
systems and elements’ (Matthews [2008], 37)3. Cognitivists emphasize how aesthetic 
judgements shift with changes in belief. Discovering that a painting is a forgery doesn’t simply 
lower the painting’s financial value, but makes a difference to aesthetic appreciation. Cognitivism 
explains such changes in judgement by claiming that mistaken knowledge about the painting 
leads to mistaken aesthetic judgements. I’ll take Derek Turner as my representative cognitivist 
due to his relatively moderate account and his focus on scientific practice. I’ll start by 
summarizing Turner’s view, before turning to two objections which motivate my account. 
2.1 Paleoaesthetics 
By ‘historical cognitivism’, knowledge of an object’s history enhances our aesthetic 
appreciation of that object. Turner develops the view by examining the practices of historical 
scientists: palaeontologists, archaeologists and geologists. Many scientific practices are tightly 
knit with artistic ones, such as the artistry of fossil preparation (Wylie [2015]), sketches in 
geological fieldwork, and the appreciation of biological function. For Turner, it isn’t simply that 
 
3 For more on the relationship between aesthetic judgment and background knowledge see Danto 
([1981]) and Goodman ([1976]). 
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knowledge feeds into aesthetic appreciation, but that aesthetic appreciation is required to 
explain scientific success. 
On the one hand, historical cognitivism shows how the epistemic dimension of the 
paleosciences contributes to aesthetic engagement with fossils and landscapes. On the 
other hand, Caitlin Wylie’s work shows how aesthetic practices such as fossil preparation 
make an indispensable contribution to scientific inquiry. This suggests that the aesthetic 
and epistemic dimensions of paleoscience render mutual support. But that, in turn, 
suggests that it is a mistake to try to work out the epistemology of historical science 
without also exploring paleoaesthetics. (Turner [2019], 18) 
I agree with Turner’s second hand, and my view makes headway on how aesthetic sensibility 
plays a role in scientists’ epistemic activities. Turner rightly emphasizes the critical importance of 
aesthetic judgement and sensibilities in shaping research: identifying when an experiment is 
working well, say, or determining the significance of a new discovery. Turner and I part on that 
first hand.  
Here’s his version of historical cognitivism:  
Knowledge of living things and natural systems – including knowledge of the history of 
those things – deepens and enhances our aesthetic engagement with those things, 
relative to various kinds of naïve engagement. (Ibid, 20) 
Turner’s view is ceteris paribus: according to historical cognitivism, holding an agent fixed 
other than their knowledge, they will have richer aesthetic engagement with more knowledge 
than less. So, were I to be otherwise the same, but knew less about the history of the Jurassic 
Coast, my appreciation of its natural beauty would decrease. Many objections to cognitivism 
target its systematicity (Carroll [2013], Stecker [1997]): even if knowledge sometimes increases 
aesthetic appreciation, surely it needn’t always. Discovering new facts about an object of 
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appreciation might decrease appreciation. However, sophisticated cognitivists needn’t claim a 
direct connection between beauty and truth; what matters for their view is that new knowledge 
shapes or deepens aesthetic sensibility. And deeper aesthetic appreciation needn’t involve 
beauty: new knowledge might reveal ugly depths. In light of this, I’ll describe the phenomenon at 
hand as partial sensitivity: sensitivity between aesthetic judgement and knowledge is only partial 
because changes in beliefs do not necessitate changes in aesthetic appreciation. On my view, this 
is because their connection is psychological and depends on features of the agent and their 
context. 
So, for my purposes, there are two components of Turner’s view worth highlighting. First a 
factive component: true belief constrains aesthetic judgement. Second, as we’ve seen, partial 
sensitivity: our aesthetic judgements change in light of our doxastic states. These are logically 
independent: an agent might change their doxastic states, and this may affect their aesthetic 
judgment, without changes in factivity. According to partial sensitivity I might, for instance, 
develop false beliefs about the Jurassic Coast, and this might deepen (or otherwise) my aesthetic 
engagement; it is only factivity that demands those beliefs be true. Consider Turner’s discussion 
of Robert Elliot’s thought experiment ([1982]), which compares a genuine Vermeer with a 
forgery: 
Two paintings can be qualitatively identical, but if they have different histories, we might 
justifiably value them differently… If you have false beliefs about that painting… then 
your aesthetic engagement with the artwork is misfiring in at least one important way. 
(Turner [2019], 10) 
In having false beliefs about the forgery, I’m not simply making an epistemic mistake, I’m 
making an aesthetic mistake. For Turner our aesthetic appreciation is both sensitive to our beliefs 
and to our knowledge states: getting it right counts. On his view, ‘false beliefs about the past 
undermine aesthetic engagement in a significant way’ (22).  
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2.2 A conceptual objection 
I’ve highlighted two components of Turner’s account: factivity and partial sensitivity. I think 
his arguments favour the latter but not the former: 
The basic argument in favour of historical cognitivism is just that it is the only view that 
can make sense of such cases, where revising our beliefs about an item’s history 
completely changes the character of our aesthetic engagement with that item. Aesthetic 
judgements about things are sensitive to beliefs about history (Turner [2019], 23). 
No doubt how I value something depends in part on my beliefs, but it doesn’t follow that my 
beliefs must be true4. The historical cognitivist claims that ceteris paribus, aesthetic appreciation 
increases with knowledge. The crucial comparison for testing factivity, then, involves two agents 
who have equally-well-grounded beliefs about an object, but where one belief is false and the 
other is true. On such comparisons, I’ll argue, factivity is implausible. In making this conceptual 
argument, I hope you’ll forgive me for taking liberty with two historical figures who perhaps 
philosophers of science have abused enough: Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. 
Both Kepler and Brahe were intimately concerned with patterns governing the heavens, 
spent hours intensely studying their subject (although Kepler tended towards abstract 
mathematical pondering and Brahe laborious data-gathering) and made important scientific 
contributions (see Jardine [1984] for a more responsible treatment). However, we now think that 
Kepler got something right that Brahe didn’t. Brahe departed from the Ptolemaic system by 
 
4 Another context where ‘factivity’ is denied is recent defences of the epistemic good of understanding 
(e.g., Potochnik [2017], Elgin [2018], De Regt [2015]). My discussion differs. First, such accounts deny the 
link between two epistemic goods: truth and understanding, while mine splits truth from aesthetic 
appreciation. Second, on these accounts truth plays an important role: to understand some phenomenon 
we must get it true enough. That is, truth still constrains the realm of understanding. This might be 
plausible for understanding, but I provide reasons for denying that truth plays any direct role in 
constraining aesthetic judgement or appreciation (although no doubt, through epistemic engagement, the 
two are indirectly linked). Recently Elgin ([2020]) connects aesthetics with understanding, but again we 
part on the role of truth in the same way. 
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placing the planets in orbit around the sun, however his sun orbited a stationary Earth. 
Meanwhile, Kepler’s Earth moved. Philosophers in the mid-twentieth-Century made much hay of 
this difference. Here’s Hanson describing the two watching a sunrise: 
Tycho sees the sun beginning its journey from horizon to horizon. He sees that from 
some celestial vantage point the sun (carrying with it the moon and planets) could be 
watched circling our fixed earth. Watching the sun at dawn through Tychonic spectacles 
would be to see it in something like this way. Kepler's visual field, however, has a 
different conceptual organization... But Kepler will see the horizon dipping, or turning 
away, from our fixed local star. (Hanson [1958], 23) 
Hanson is interested in the theory-laddeness of observation, suggesting that Brahe and 
Kepler’s differing theoretical frameworks led to perceptual differences: they in fact see 
differently. Let’s not worry about that. Instead, let’s consider the two men’s aesthetic 
experiences (we’ll briefly consider other aspects of aesthetic appreciation below). Should we 
consider Brahe’s aesthetic experience of a moving sun less aesthetically rich than Kepler’s 
aesthetic experience of a fixed sun because the sun is in fact fixed (relative to the Earth)? Let’s 
imagine both have spent equal time struggling with astronomical theories, gathering 
observational data, and simply gazing heavenward—they are, in the parlance I’ll adopt below, 
equal in epistemic engagement. According to factivity, we should accord them different aesthetic 
appreciation. To paraphrase Turner, Brahe’s aesthetic appreciation is misfiring in at least one 
important way. Regarding aesthetic experience at least, I don’t think we should agree: the 
thought that the truth or otherwise of Brahe’s hard-won beliefs would make a difference to his 
aesthetic experience is a strange one. To see this, imagine now the same scenario—Brahe and 
Kepler gazing at a sun rise—except we are in a Brahonic world. It is Kepler whose appreciation is 
misfiring in at least one important way. By my lights, holding fixed our agents but altering the 
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truth of their beliefs doesn’t change their aesthetic experience: switching between Keplerian and 
Brahonic worlds, I think, suggests aesthetic experiences are not sensitive to the facts. 
Factivity makes aesthetic engagement turn on the wrong kind of thing. Brahe and Kepler’s 
aesthetic experience is equal both in worlds with stationary and shifting suns. Notice—and this 
leads us towards ‘epistemic engagement’—that making Brahe and Kepler equal in depth of 
aesthetic experience involved equalizing their ‘epistemic labour’ (and equalizing other features 
such as, say, differing inclinations to enjoying sunrises).  
Imagine now that Kepler’s mum watches a sunrise, and let’s imagine that despite her 
ignorance of astronomy she believes the sun is stationary, as her son told her. In this scenario, 
although Kepler’s mum hasn’t spent long considering the heavens, her aesthetic judgment 
compared to Brahe is firing in at least one important way: she correctly appreciates the sun 
‘rising’ due to a shifting Earth. With due respect to Kepler’s mum, this is the wrong thing to say: it 
is the long periods of study—again, of epistemic labour—which affords Kepler and Brahe their 
knowledge-based aesthetic experience5. Not whether they happen to be right or not. If Brahe’s 
dad had been there, and trusting in his son’s wisdom believed he watched a sun whizzing about a 
stationary earth, I don’t think his aesthetic experiences would have been any worse or better 
than that of Kepler’s mum simply on the basis of one happening to be right, and the other 
happening to be wrong. Of course, if Brahe were to find out that the Earth moved, this might 
change his aesthetic appreciation of sunrises, but this is just partial sensitivity: aesthetic 
judgements turning on doxastic states. But that is not factivity. Let’s consider four responses. 
First, by Turner’s account the relevant comparison is not two agents, but an agent and a 
more naïve copy. The comparison is not between Kepler and Brahe, but between them and their 
comparatively ignorant counterparts. This is fair, but I can accommodate this subtlety. Compare 
 
5 (at least in part, of course, features of the agent such as their aesthetic capabilities also play a role: 
but the thought experiment asks us to hold these fixed) 
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the actual Kepler with a possible Kepler who, despite performing the same epistemic labour, 
believes in a stationary Earth (or the actual Brahe with his more correct counterpart). As above, 
there do not here seem to be grounds for claiming that Kepler has better aesthetic appreciation 
simply because he has a true belief. 
Second, you might object that Brahe is very knowledgeable about astronomy: he is not naïve 
in the relevant way. And indeed ‘knowledge’ goes beyond the mere possession of particular 
propositional truths. We might, then, adopt a broader reading of knowledge that includes a 
broader set of epistemic goods—understanding, applicability, transferability, and so forth. 
Indeed, both Turner and myself adopt such a pluralistic conception of the epistemic. But take this 
too far and you lose factivity: Brahe no longer aesthetically misfires due to a false belief.  
A third objection complains that I’ve conflated aesthetic appreciation with aesthetic 
experience. As there is more to the aesthetic than experience6, we might agree that the truth or 
otherwise of Brahe and Kepler’s beliefs won’t change their experience of the sunrise, but insist 
that truth makes a difference to other aspects of their aesthetic lives. Perhaps truth matters for 
aesthetic reflections on sunrises? Again, it doesn’t seem that our being in a Brahonic or Keplerian 
world makes a difference to the depth of the two men’s memories of, or surmisings after, the 
sunrise’s aesthetic properties. Indeed, an important aspect of such reflection is building 
connections between differing objects of aesthetic appreciation, and it may be that Brahe, armed 
with his false beliefs, is better-positioned to draw some aesthetic connections than Kepler. For 
instance, Brahe’s retention of an Earth-centred universe affords connections between the 
structure of the heavens and various religious beliefs about our place in the cosmos. So, at least 
in principle false beliefs might make for richer aesthetic reflections than true. My claims about 
aesthetic experience, then, prima facie extend to aesthetic appreciation broadly construed. 
 
6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this excellent point. 
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Fourth, you might be concerned about my employment of an intuition pump: surely 
arguments in the philosophy of science shouldn’t be decided on the basis of thought 
experiments. I share this worry, but it is important to see where the argument gets us. It puts the 
notion of ‘epistemic labour’ on the table, and highlights a point of disagreement between myself 
and cognitivists. Where they see (something akin to) a conceptual link between aesthetic and 
epistemic sensibilities and judgments, I see it as built from epistemic labour. This is a crucial plank 
in my positive view. Finally, the argument doesn’t stand alone, but complements an argument 
from scientific practice: let’s turn to that now. 
2.3 An objection from scientific practice 
By factivity, aesthetic appreciation is sensitive to truth. Further, for Turner aesthetic values 
are rife through scientific practice. However, many scientific practices are carried out in full 
awareness of falsity, particularly those involving idealization: representations which do not only 
abstract from how the world is—omission—but distort it (Levy [forthcoming], Weisberg [2007], 
Cartwright [1984]). As Kwame Anthony Appiah has put it, idealizations involve  ‘useful untruths’ 
(Appiah [2017], 1), representations that we know are false but nonetheless serve important 
epistemic purposes (see also Wimsatt [1987]). ‘In idealization, we build a picture—a model—of 
something that proceeds as if something we know is false were true’ (Ibid, 127, original italics). 
Understanding untruths can generate bountiful knowledge. Angela Potochnik has recently 
argued that idealizations play a more central role in science than philosophers have recognized. 
… idealizations are both rampant and unchecked in science. By rampant, I mean that 
idealizations are found throughout our best scientific products, and they stand in for 
even crucial causal influences. By unchecked, I mean that little effort is put towards 
eliminating or even controlling these idealizations. (Potochnik [2017], 40-41) 
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On Potochnik’s view, truth-departing idealizations are found everywhichwhere we look in 
science, and cannot be explained away as merely omitting unimportant details. Consider human 
behaviour: classical economists model us as utility-maximising rational actors; behavioural 
ecologists model us as adopting strategies to maximize our fitness within our local social 
environment; evolutionary psychologists model us as ruled by psychological mechanisms which 
evolved in response to Pleistocene environments. These scientists know that real human 
behaviour is not utility nor fitness maximizing, nor are we helpless servants of our evolutionary 
pasts. Scientists simulating galaxy and solar-system formation, using agent-based models to 
understand ecological communities, exploring black holes using fluid mechanical experiments, 
and so forth, know their models depart radically from the natural systems they’re interested in. 
Such scientists often think their empirical tools and frameworks are useful even though they 
depart from reality. Adam Toon puts the philosophical challenge nicely: ‘how are we to make 
sense of the fact that a large part of scientific practice seems to involve talking and learning 
about things that do not exist?’ (Toon [2012], 2). Toon’s solution, and of many others, is to adopt 
fictionalism about models (Levy [2012], Frigg & Nguyen [2016], Godfrey-Smith [2009a]). Model 
systems are not representations of real systems, but of pretend systems. Such scientists are 
engaging in a kind of epistemically rich pretence.  
Several philosophers—Potochnik in particular—argue that rampant idealization underwrites 
doubt about whether truth is a primary scientific goal, often pointing towards ‘understanding’ as 
a better fit. Milena Ivanova ([2017b], [2020]), for instance, suggests the disconnect between 
truth and scientific practice should lead us to think of aesthetic appreciation in particular as 
geared towards understanding. As we’ll see, there are important connections between my 
positive view and hers, but I’ll avoid committing to a particular epistemic good such as 
understanding; scientific values and goals are too varied and too tied to local context to be 
amenable to monistic treatments. 
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The challenge for historical cognitivism is this: if aesthetic value, like idealization, is rampant 
and unchecked in science, then factivity about aesthetic value is puzzling. Factivity connects 
aesthetic appreciation and truth, while unchecked idealization suggests indifference to truth. If 
cognitivism is true, then scientists’ aesthetic sensibilities should be tied more-or-less directly with 
truth-generation. But insofar as idealizations lead us to truth, the route is complex and indirect. 
One needn’t adopt as all-pervasive a view on idealizations as Potochnik, nor fictionalism about 
scientific models (indeed, I don’t: Currie [2017]), to see the problem. If aesthetic judgements are 
as widespread in scientific practice as Turner argues, especially if aesthetic judgements play a role 
in shaping and guiding scientists, and the aesthetic is made more rich via truth, then scientists 
spending so much time intimately engaged with tools and techniques which they explicitly do not 
believe to be true is mysterious. Further, insofar as aesthetic judgement serves as a guide for 
scientific practice—if aesthetic sensibility is rampant through science—then presumably it plays a 
critical role in the employment of useful falsehoods. And it is unclear how cognitivism can make 
sense of this. 
One might insist that idealizations are true nonetheless, perhaps by adopting a pragmatic 
theory of truth, whereby ‘useful untruths’ become somewhat oxymoronic, or by attempting to 
argue that idealizations are true after all. I’m open to the first suggestion, although such an 
account takes us far from the intuitions motivating factivity. On the second suggestion, no doubt 
there is much truth in science. But it is critical for a view like Turner’s that aesthetic judgement 
plays a guiding role in scientific practice, that is, that aesthetic value and judgement feeds directly 
into scientists’ generating truth. Even if idealizations, circuitously and surprisingly, are often 
involved in truth-generating practices (and indeed some are), this indirectness sits uncomfortably 
with the direct connection between aesthetic judgment and truth that cognitivists require. 
Happily, by dropping factivity and replacing it with what I’ll call ‘epistemic engagement’ we can 
reconcile idealization with aesthetic value. 
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3. Aesthetics and Epistemology without Factivity 
I’ve provided two objections to factivity. The objection from scientific practice emphasized 
that many aspects of scientists’ daily work departs from the construction of accurate—fact-
based—representations. The conceptual objection argued that it is epistemic labour, not truth, 
which makes a difference to aesthetic appreciation. My aim in this section is to first, develop a 
notion of epistemic engagement which captures these two thoughts while cohering with partial 
sensitivity; second, use this to reconceptualise the relationship between epistemology and 
aesthetics. Knowledge doesn’t help us see beauty, learning helps us see knowledge as beautiful. 
We’ve two questions then. What is the relationship between epistemic activity and aesthetic 
appreciation which explains partial sensitivity? How does aesthetic appreciation feed into 
epistemic practice? In 3.1 I’ll answer the former, in 3.2 the latter. 
3.1 Epistemic Engagement 
Thi Nguyen has argued that although ‘aesthetic judgements can be straightforwardly correct 
or incorrect’ ([2019], 3), correctness isn’t the point of forming aesthetic judgements: for Nguyen, 
the value of forming aesthetic judgements is the activity of aesthetic engagement.  
… the value of aesthetic appreciation lies in or arises from the processes of engagement 
involved in forming aesthetic judgments. ‘Aesthetic engagement’ here includes our 
higher-level cognition of aesthetic objects: searching for connections, rethinking 
interpretations, discovering affective resonances, and so on. It also includes low-level 
forms of engagement such as perceptual engagement: actively shifting one’s attention 
from one perceptual detail to the next, and then assembling these details into a larger 




Nguyen argues that while aesthetic engagement is the search for aesthetic truth, the value of 
aesthetic engagement is not in the final product—some judgment of aesthetic value—but in the 
process itself7. Nguyen draws a contrast with science: ‘…science and art appreciation have very 
different purposes. In art appreciation, we aim at making correct aesthetic judgements. But 
having correct aesthetic judgments isn’t the purpose of the practice… On the other hand, we 
demand indirect autonomy in empirical life because we significantly value getting things right, 
and that value often outweighs the values associated with doing things for ourselves’ (10). 
Nguyen is interested in testimonial contexts, where scientists are experts, rather than scientists’ 
aesthetic and epistemic goals per se. However, considering the two lessons from the last section: 
that many scientists knowingly employ ‘useful untruths’, and that aesthetic appreciation seems 
to track epistemic labour rather than truth, it seems Nguyen draws science and art appreciation 
too far apart. 
I think a notion of ‘epistemic engagement’, closely paralleling Nguyen’s idea, better captures 
how epistemic hard-yards bring aesthetic dividends, thus capturing what Kepler and Brahe hold 
in common—their epistemic labour—despite their differences vis-à-vis getting it right. Like 
Nguyen’s concept epistemic engagement is purposefully broad. It is, at base, the process of 
developing epistemic judgments. Examining a section of strata and deciding it formed in the 
Jurassic, or considering some hypothesis and reckoning it well-founded, say. More carefully: 
To be epistemically engaged is to partake genuinely in a knowledge-directed process of 
coming to epistemic judgements. 
A process is ‘knowledge-directed’ when those engaged in the process believe the process is 
likely to generate knowledge. When I take my friend’s word that some section of strata hails 
from the Jurassic, this is because I believe I’ve good reason to take them as having the relevant 
 




expertise, thus their testimony vis-à-vis the strata is a way towards knowledge. Thus, the process 
is knowledge-directed. I’ll take ‘epistemic judgements’ broadly: philosophers have discussed 
many epistemic goods, from truth to understanding, to judgments about explanatoriness, and so 
on. A judgment is epistemic just in case it is towards one of those goods (or ‘bads’ for negative 
judgements). By ‘genuine’ I mean to partake in a knowledge-directed process in order to gain 
knowledge, as opposed to, say, ironically or for some other purpose. Disingenuous epistemic 
engagement doesn’t foreclose gaining knowledge, but matters here for capturing partial 
sensitivity. If Brahe doesn’t care about getting it right, then it isn’t so obvious to me that 
correcting his beliefs about sunrises would make a difference to his experience of them. 
Epistemic engagement makes sense of how Brahe and Kepler might be equal in epistemic labour: 
they have genuinely engaged equally in various processes of coming to epistemic judgments 
about the heavens. 
Nguyen is right that an upshot of epistemic judgment (engagement) can be the truth. But 
that is not its only fruit. Another is deepened aesthetic appreciation. The last section’s 
discussions suggest a connection between epistemic engagement and aesthetic appreciation, 
and that such engagement deepens appreciation regardless of the epistemic judgement’s truth. 
This accommodates partial sensitivity: the activity has to be considered knowledge-directed by 
the agent—if Brahe were to learn that his judgement about the sun’s movement was in error, he 
would likely change his aesthetic appreciation of the sunrise—but knowledge-direction is 
doxastic. That is, the scientist believes that engaging with that object will lead to them learning 
things. Scientists working with idealizations do not (or shouldn’t) believe these are veridical 
representations, but they nonetheless have conviction that working with, examining, 
considering—epistemically engaging—with such representations will lead to insight, 
understanding, and other kinds of knowledge. 
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So, to be epistemically engaged is to partake genuinely in a knowledge-directed process of 
coming to epistemic judgements. Epistemic engagement explains partial sensitivity without 
factivity because although processes of belief formation can enrich aesthetic engagement, the 
epistemic judgments arrived at need not be true for that aesthetic payoff. Learning that a 
scientific practice is not knowledge-directed—that it generates misunderstanding, say—leads to 
changes in aesthetic appreciation. The economist, let’s imagine, who previously found deep 
satisfaction in understanding the behaviour of large-scale society in terms of individual economic 
self-interest, upon coming to believe that the idealization is epistemically pernicious, might no 
longer find that satisfaction. Learning that your model is not knowledge-directed can change 
aesthetic appreciation towards both model and target system. 
Epistemic engagement takes myriad forms. A modeller explores a new iteration; an 
experimenter probes after confounding variables; a field geologist scans the horizon hunting for 
tell-tale signs of stratigraphic variation; an archaeologist painstakingly marks out a future 
excavation site. But also: a journalist drafts a piece on a scientific discovery, a lecturer sketches 
the contours of a scientific theory, a parent reads Quantum Physics for Babies to their child. Each 
of these activities can involve partaking in a genuinely knowledge-directed process. And, 
plausibly, each doesn’t only bring epistemic dividends but aesthetic ones too. When my friend 
points out a layer of red sandstone along the Jurassic coast, explaining these are the remains of a 
long-ago—180 million years old—drowned desert, they draw my attention to the sandstone’s 
rich colour, its patterns of sedimentation and erosion, and help me view the current shape and 
sweep of the coast as the result of millions of years of geological toing and froing. With a good 
enough imagination, perhaps, they help me see the landscape as dry and dusty, and haunted by 
the ghosts of long-dead Triassic denizens. And indeed, I might come to see myself a speck adrift 
in a great sea of time, part of a grand unfolding narrative. Even if my friend happens to be wrong, 
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if, like Brahe, they’ve false beliefs despite their epistemic engagement, this doesn’t deny me the 
attention to detail, new appreciation and aesthetic payoff8. 
This leaves open just what the connection between epistemic engagement and aesthetics is. 
In virtue of what does engaging in a knowledge-directed process of coming to epistemic 
judgements bring aesthetic fruits? As we’ll see, my answer will connect epistemic engagement 
with what I’ll call ‘attunement’: aesthetic judgment being co-opted towards, and becoming 
enmeshed with, epistemic judgement. 
3.2 Attunement 
Thus far, I’ve argued in favour of partial sensitivity: changes in our beliefs (often) make a 
difference to our aesthetic appreciation, and argued against factivity: our aesthetic appreciation 
doesn’t turn on getting things right. In light of this, I’ve developed a notion of epistemic 
engagement, which is to genuinely partake in a knowledge-directed process of developing 
epistemic judgements. I’ve suggested that epistemic engagement explains partial sensitivity, as a 
product of such engagement is deeper aesthetic sensitivity. But what is the nature of this 
product: are knowledge and aesthetics connected via necessary, conceptual, semantic or 
metaphysical links? I think the connection between truth and beauty is contingent, and due to 
the kinds of beings we happen to be. In becoming scientists, aesthetic judgements are co-opted 
for scientific purposes. That is, aesthetic faculties are ‘attuned’ to science’s epistemic purposes. 
My argument is empirical and speculative, but nonetheless I think the gambit a good one, and 
will collect some considerations in favour of it9. 
 
8 My account is officially uncommitted vis-à-vis the objectivity of aesthetic judgment. I prefer to think 
of ‘better’ or ‘deeper’ aesthetic appreciation as relativized to the processes of attunement at hand. 
9 I am not assuming a homogenous conception of how humans aesthetically appreciate—far from it—
Our species’ diversity is reflected in our aesthetic faculties and sensibilities. 
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Turner emphasizes the aesthetic sensibilities involved in geological fieldwork, a common 
theme in field-based sciences. Consider the geologist Haakon Fossen’s reflection on field 
sketches. 
Geology is, by nature, a field-based branch of science, and making on-site sketches is the 
best way to approach an outcrop. Why? Because field sketching sharpens your senses 
and turns you into a much better observer. It forces you to focus, to make important 
decisions regarding crucial structures and features, such as cross-cutting relations, 
sequence boundaries, fault geometry, layer continuity and grain size variations. It makes 
you discover important details that otherwise might go unnoticed. And it makes the 
locality stick to your mind. (Fossen [2013]) 
Sketching geological formations is important for training students to see like geologists: 
picking out pertinent details, learning how to represent them; making judgements about what is 
of epistemic import in geological formations (Turner [2019]). Similar might be said of fieldwork in 
archaeology. Archaeologists are keenly aware that extraction, required for the production of 
archaeological knowledge, is destructive (Chapman & Wylie [2016]). The fieldworker continually 
makes judgement calls about what to extract, how, and what information to retrieve. 
Archaeological interpretation, as Ian Hodder infamously put it, ‘occurs at the trowel’s edge’ 
(Hodder [1999], 83). Caitlin Wylie has emphasized similar in fossil preparation: 
… distinguishing coveted fossilized bone from useless rock requires the tacit knowledge 
of expert visual judgment and manual skill to reveal the fossil by destroying the rock (i.e., 
the process of fossil preparation). Because of this, the same starting rock can result in a 
variety of different specimens. (Wylie [2019], 24). 
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So, these kinds of knowhow do not simply matter for observation, but interpretation. And, as 
Turner emphasizes, this knowhow has an undoubted aesthetic quality. But whence comes this 
quality? Reflecting on scientific training leads us to an answer.  
Recently, philosophers of science have rethought Thomas Kuhn’s legacy, in particular, de-
emphasizing his notion of ‘scientific revolutions’ and their attendant worries about 
incommensurability, in favour of his idea of ‘normal science’ (see, for example, Godfrey-Smith 
2009b). In brief, Kuhn argues that normal science is built around a ‘paradigm’, which begins as a 
work considered an exemplar of how to do science of that type (Kuhn [1962]). For instance, 
Augustus Pitt-Rivers’ late-nineteenth-Century excavations of Roman and Saxon remains were 
influential both in terms of what was collected (everything, not just fancy-looking specimens) 
and how they were categorized (according to an evolutionary typology of human culture). 
Although the latter aspect is long discarded, the methodical and analytical approach he adopted 
was an exemplar for later archaeologists (Hamilton [1999], Chapman & Wylie [2016]). And 
indeed, some of Pitt-Rivers’ techniques became codified in best-practices, discussed in 
archaeological publications, taught in universities, and so forth. Such exemplars provide a kind of 
template for how to do a kind of science: what sorts of questions to ask, what sorts of methods 
to use in data collection and interpretation, what kinds of evidence is satisfactory, and so forth. 
Sticking with archaeology, that generations of archaeologists have attended similar field sites, 
undergone similar trading—been faced with the same kinds of decisions and provided with the 
same conceptual and physical toolkits to respond—plausibly plays an important role in those 
archaeologists sharing a more-or-less common conception of what archaeology is.  
This Kuhnian perspective adds a layer to our discussion of geological fieldwork. It isn’t only 
that fieldwork matters for learning skills and interpretation, but that shared and similar 
experiences in the field generate common skills and common methods of interpretation. Such 
are the material practices from which a paradigm is made. So for fieldwork, so also for work in 
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the lab, work in the undergraduate lecture theatre, and informal discussions in the hallway, café 
or pub.  
I’ll describe these various social practices and shared experiences as ‘attuning’ scientist to 
paradigm; provisioning them with the conceptual apparatus, skills and perspective of a scientist 
of that type. I understand attunement broadly: it is a multifactorial process incorporating 
perception, motivation, judgement, both tacit and explicit knowledge as well as skills and 
expectations. Through a process of attunement an agent’s perceptual and conceptual apparatus 
are geared towards the goals and purposes of that activity. My psychological gambit is that these 
processes of attunement often coopt an agent’s aesthetic repertoire towards epistemic aims. 
Field sketching, as Fossen discusses it, doesn’t simply teach the mechanical and epistemic skill of 
recording relevant information about a geological site, the activity also trains aesthetic 
sensibilities. The scientist learns which sketches and which sites look ‘good’, the differences 
between ugly and well-ordered strata, and so forth.  
McAllister’s similarly psychological account is often read via the mechanism of ‘exposure’ 
(e.g., Ivanova [2017a]), and contrasting this with attunement is instructive. (It is worth noting 
that McAllister doesn’t explicitly appeal to exposure and it may be that attunement, as I 
characterise it, is what he has in mind). ‘Exposure’ is taken from psychology: at base, it is the idea 
that simply spending time with (being ‘merely exposed to’) art is enough to increase reported 
liking of said art (e.g., Cutting [2003]). So, perhaps pedagogical processes in science inculcate a 
positive aesthetic regard for what is being taught via repeated exposure. Students repeatedly 
studying and practicing, say, field sketching techniques will, by exposure, end up considering 
such techniques and their products with aesthetic approval. It has been questioned both 
whether ‘mere’ exposure leads to positive aesthetic judgement (Meskin et al [2013]) and whether 
it is sufficient for the complex job aesthetic judgments play in science (Ivanova [2020]). Likely 
exposure plays some kind of role in attunement, but what I have in mind is richer than entrained 
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positive aesthetic regard. To demonstrate, I’ll say more about how attunement meshes aesthetic 
and epistemic judgement. 
It might be tempting to read scientific aesthetic judgments in expressivist terms (e.g., Todd 
[2004]). That is, the aesthetic content of epistemic phenomena are not properly-speaking 
judgements, but positively or negatively valanced responses. On this picture, the aesthetic is a 
thin veneer which guides the epistemological, propositional business of science. I think 
expressivism is an open position given what I’ve said, and especially so if we think exposure is the 
right account of ‘attunement’. However, I doubt it captures the connection between the 
aesthetic and the epistemic in scientific practice. Instead, I’ll suggest they’re more closely-knit 
than this. 
Anna Alexandrova ([2016], [2017]) has developed a notion of a mixed claim, which is a 
scientific hypothesis that is ‘thick’ in something like Ryle’s sense. Here’s her definition: 
‘A hypothesis is mixed if and only if  
1. It is an empirical claim about a putative causal or statistical relation. 
2. At least one of the variables in this claim is defined in a way that presupposes a moral, 
prudential or political value judgement about the nature of this variable’ (Alexandrova 
[2017], 82). 
Although Alexandrova’s definition covers hypotheses, she is clear that mutatis mutandis we 
can have ‘mixed theories, mixed measures, and more generally mixed sciences’ (82). For 
instance, measuring a population’s self-reported life satisfaction is an empirical activity, yet those 
who do it either explicitly or implicitly assume that such information is a good proxy for 
wellbeing. Alexandrova argues that the science of wellbeing (and other social sciences generally) 
are constructed from such mixed claims—and moreover that mixed claims are here to stay. 
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I think many of the scientific judgments we’ve been discussing: which part of the cliff to 
represent in a drawing, how to excavate an archaeological site, how to prepare a fossil, what 
makes for an interesting iteration of a model, a good guiding research question, or intervention 
on an experimental system, are ‘aesthetically mixed judgements’. Their content involves 
interweaving aesthetic and epistemic judgements. This is due to processes of attunement: the 
scientists’ perceptions, motivation, judgement, skills and expectations are turned towards 
scientific practices and purposes. This includes both perceptual capacities, skills and motivational 
systems. The preceding discussion makes plausible that these motivational systems are often—
although not always—aesthetic (in the low falutin’ sense). As a scientist develops their skill and 
knowledge, they also learn that discipline’s, subfield’s or (even) lab’s aesthetic perspective. The 
aesthetic and the epistemic aspects are intimately linked. Science does not only involve 
aesthetically mixed hypotheses, judgements and standards, but also mixed skills, expectations 
and knowhow. We might artificially, for explication, split the aesthetic from the epistemic, but 
these are abstractions on our part. This explains the close-knit connection between some 
aesthetic and epistemic theoretical virtues. For instance, notions of ‘simplicity’ are often 
discussed as if they are unproblematically epistemic, and sometimes as being unproblematically 
aesthetic. If I’m right, this is because both aspects are interwoven in aesthetically mixed 
judgements. They are paradigmatically epistemic and paradigmatically aesthetic simultaneously. 
So, where exposure is a psychological mechanism whereby repeated interaction with an 
object increases our positive aesthetic regard for it, attunement is a processes whereby aesthetic 
judgements, sensibilities and capacities are tuned to epistemic purposes, thus producing 
aesthetically mixed judgements and capacities. 
Milena Ivanova’s recent ([2020]) discussion of the connection between aesthetics and 
scientific judgement also provides a useful contrast case. Like me, she emphasizes the 
contingent, psychological connection between aesthetic regard and knowledge. However, 
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Ivanova argues that the aesthetic qualities of scientific theories are reflections of our cognitive 
preferences: 
[aesthetic properties] are properties of our theories only because we decided to 
construct them in such a way, and we decide to construct them this way because it is 
most convenient for us to operate with theories that satisfy our aesthetic and intellectual 
requirements. (Ivanova [2020], 90) 
On Ivanova’s view, there are stable aesthetic preferences ‘deeply ingrained in human 
thinking’ (89) which are reflected in the aesthetic properties of scientific theories. Aesthetic 
preferences come first, driving theory construction; our theories are ‘attuned’ to pre-existing 
aesthetic preferences. On the attunement view aesthetic preferences are much more dynamic; 
the aesthetic properties of our theories (and other scientific products and practices!) are not the 
product of more-or-less innate preferences, but are structured and turned towards epistemic 
goals through pedagogical processes.  
Turner discusses what he calls ‘aesthetic-epistemic feedback effects’, whereby our aesthetic 
appreciation and knowledge of nature feed into, structure and motivate one another: 
Not only does historical research make for richer aesthetic engagement, but aesthetic 
engagement can also deepen and enhance scientific investigation. Aesthetic engagement 
and historical investigation are mutually facilitating. (Turner [2019], 29). 
Especially in pedagogy, such feedback loops undermine Ivanova’s one-way connection from 
aesthetics to knowledge. The aesthetic difference between, say, a physicist who prizes highly 
controlled, precise experimentation and the anthropologist who embraces the rich, complex 
ambiguity of an ethnographic report lies in part on the differing feedbacks they partook of during 
their training. Epistemic engagement with experimentation or ethnographies involves 
developing aesthetic appreciation geared towards them, and as Turner would have it that 
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developing appreciation enhances and feeds into the scientists’ epistemic prowess vis-à-vis those 
practices. In attunement, aesthetic sensibility and judgments meet and entangle with epistemic 
practice. 
For example, Kirsten Walsh and I (Currie & Walsh [2019]) discuss what we call ‘explanatory 
expectations’ to highlight differences in individual historians’ ideas about which explanations of 
historical phenomena are acceptable. Explanatory expectations are generated by a scientist’s 
training in addition to peculiarities of the explanatory target. Terms like ‘elegant’, ‘satisfactory’, 
‘powerful’ and so forth, are often applied to various explanations, and how these are applied 
differ across contexts. A palaeontologist used to complex narrative explanations of change 
across macroevolutionary time will have quite different ‘instincts’ regarding what a good 
explanation ‘looks like’ (Currie [2019]) than, say, a classical economist trained to analytic proofs. 
A plausible psychological story concerning explanatory expectations could appeal to the oft-
discussed ‘aha moment’: a phenomenal feeling of satisfaction accompanying an explanation 
(Kounios & Beeman [2009]). Alison Gopnik ([1998]) has suggested that we consider the aha 
aspect of an explanation as analogous to orgasm: as orgasm is tied to our motivational systems 
towards sex, so is the aha moment how our motivational systems lead us towards knowledge. 
Aha moments as signals of explanatory expectations being met are perhaps the most 
obvious case of an aesthetic response—satisfaction, a sense of completeness or closedness—
being adapted to an epistemic purpose. But I think such phenomena are varied and widespread. 
Aesthetic sensibility plays a role in scientists’ detecting completeness, their explanatory 
expectations, what counts as a puzzle, and what is unsatisfactory. Aesthetic responses guide 
scientists in generating evidence—monitoring whether an experiment is proceeding correctly, 
whether a result ‘looks right’, and whether a hypothesis is plausible. Further, negative aesthetic 
judgments, a hypothesis’ ‘ugliness’, say, drives science both by guiding practice, setting problems 
and—potentially—leading to both epistemic and aesthetic shifts as epistemic labour does its 
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work. Science’s normativity plays out in an aesthetic mode. However I doubt this aesthetic mode 
relies on deeply engrained aesthetic judgments as Ivanova would have it. It is an open question 
just how plastic our aesthetic responses are—and I’ve not sufficient space here to develop the 
thought—but reflecting on the wide, often clashing, pluralism of scientific judgements about 
explanatory and evidential adequacy, sufficiency of practice, and so forth, my bet is on plasticity. 
There is nothing about the aesthetic or the epistemic conceptually that makes them 
bedfellows. It is due to contingent features of ourselves as knowers and aesthetic appreciators. 
Conceivable beings who learn differently, or appreciate differently, might not exhibit the same 
mixed aspects, and might then make for very different scientists. This view decouples the 
objectivity of aesthetic or epistemic judgment from their relationship. We are not required to 
commit to the objectivity or otherwise of aesthetic judgment, nor epistemic judgment, in order 
to see their rich connection. 
4. Conclusion: Practice & Justification 
With epistemic engagement and attunement in place, I’ll conclude with a few comments 
regarding the justification or otherwise of scientists’ aesthetic judgments. That is, when a 
scientist expresses aesthetic approval (or disapproval) or some claim, how does that guide us vis-
à-vis epistemic justification? 
Philosophers have approached this question in several ways. First, they’ve asked whether 
aesthetic judgments might be grounded in the nature of evidence; second, they’ve asked 
whether there might be local background knowledge underwriting those preferences. Take the 
plausibly-aesthetic ‘simplicity’. Why grant epistemic preference to simpler theories (when simpler 
theories are preferred)? It could be that, prima facie, a simpler theory is more likely to be true 
because, say, of the rules of likelihood. Or it might be that there’s no simplicita defence of 
simplicity, instead some local knowledge grounds expectations of simplicity in some domain. 
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Elliot Sober, for instance, has argued for the latter regarding phylogenetic parsimony (Sober 
[1981]). In short, because evolutionary theory leads us to expect relatively robust ancestral 
relations, we should expect similarity between lineages to be due to common ancestry. Thus, we 
should prefer evolutionary trees with fewer changes in traits. Further, others have argued that 
justification lies in meta-induction, coherence or understanding. Here, I want to provide a non-
mutually exclusive third option: If scientists’ aesthetic judgments are the result of attunement 
through epistemic engagement, then their trustworthiness doesn’t turn on the aesthetic 
judgment itself, but on those processes of attunement. In light of this, we should attend to the 
epistemic properties of the training, practices and engagement from which the aesthetic 
judgements arise, not the aesthetic judgments themselves, if we are to judge their 
trustworthiness.  
Consider the mixed skills learned via geological fieldwork. Presumably geologists attuned in 
those ways will be adept at correctly identifying strata and will judge landscape in part based on 
those capacities: so, a ‘nicely ordered’ or even ‘beautiful’ stratigraphic form will be easily read, a 
‘fascinating’ strata might be in some way puzzling, while an ‘ugly’ or ‘messy’ sequence will be one 
with an unclear geological signal. To tell whether we should trust these judgments, we should 
ask after the process of attunement the geologist has undergone: the kinds of strata they are 
used to, for instance. 
One upshot is the locality of scientist’s aesthetic judgments. Explanatory expectations which 
work well in one context can misfire in another. But such misfiring is not unanalysable. 
Judgements might be transferable if the practices of attunement are to relevantly similar 
epistemic situations. But they might not be transferable: subtleties might matter. For instance, 
paleontologists tell me that getting to know a new locality—its quirks and personality—takes 
time even for those otherwise experienced. Although I think this answer can be considered 
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complementary to existing accounts of the justification of aesthetics in science, there is one 
clash: meta-inductive defences. Consideration of these returns us to our earlier Kuhnian theme. 
Above I linked attunement with Kuhn’s ‘normal science’. James McAllister also appeals to 
Kuhnian themes in his psychological account of the connection between aesthetics and scientific 
knowledge. Focusing on Kuhn’s revolutions, he argues that theory-change in science involves 
shifts in aesthetic value; it is not just our knowledge which changes, but the ‘aesthetic canon’ as 
well. This co-evolution is sometimes in lock-step, sometimes in tension. McAllister emphasizes 
the continuity in scientists’ aesthetic judgments across apparent revolutions: 
… while a community's aesthetic canon changes with time, the aesthetic preferences of 
scientists at any one time do not diverge very strongly: there is wide agreement about 
the aesthetic properties that theories should possess. This is because, far from being 
conceived at whim, scientists' aesthetic preferences are formed in a communitywide 
induction over the empirical performance of past theories. (McAllister [1996], 137-138). 
So, for McAllister, although aesthetic value is dynamic, the past successes of theories ensure 
more-or-less continuity across epistemic changes, and indeed the previous success of theories 
underwrites the goodness of scientists’ aesthetic judgements. This ‘aesthetic induction’ ensures 
the relative conservativeness of aesthetic judgements in science across time. When revolutions 
happen, McAllister considers them in terms of ‘aesthetic ruptures’: ‘as the repudiation of 
aesthetic constraints that a community had become accustomed to imposing on theory choice’ 
(131). So, on McAllister’s view, we see science as typically—often—continuous across apparent 
changes in theory due to continuity in aesthetic judgements maintained via learning and justified 
via the aesthetic induction. However, it is occasionally rocked by aesthetic ruptures (revolutions) 
where the community is split between an old-guard sticking to the old aesthetic canon and a new 
group embracing a new set of aesthetic preferences.  
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For McAllister, then, the justification of aesthetic preferences over normal science relies on 
an induction across a past history of success. On the fact of it, this clashes with the locality I’ve 
emphasized (see Ivanova [2020] for a more systematic critique of McAllister). This is because the 
aesthetic induction relies on aesthetic values being sufficiently similar. If, via processes of 
attunement, aesthetic sensibilities are dynamic and local, then such inductions are untenable. 
There’s much more here to be said. It may be that for the Theories which McAllister focuses on 
we do see the kinds of continuity that underwrites his view, while for other aspects (fieldwork, 
say) things are how I have painted them. Determining under what contexts scientists’ aesthetic 
sensibilities are sufficiently similar to warrant an inductive treatment requires a proper 
examination of local contexts. Regardless, if processes of attunement—and their subsequent 
aesthetic judgements—are local, then meta-inductive arguments like Kuiper’s ([2002]) and 
McAllister’s become weaker, as such inferences depend upon continuity across the inductive 
base, which localism undermines. 
If something like the view I’ve defended here is right, then we’ve an attractive story about 
how the epistemic and the aesthetic interact. As I learn about the Jurassic Coast—epistemically 
engage with it—this process attunes my aesthetic sensibilities to those features highlighted by 
my knowledge: its Victorian gazebos, smuggler’s coves and Mesozoic formations. And these 
sensibilities further guide my interest and investigation, deepening that epistemic engagement. 
Whether or not truth is beautiful, epistemic engagement leads me to see it as such. 
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